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1Learned Convention and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in an
Overlapping Generations Model with Two-Sided Altruism
1 Introduction
There are many unresolved issues regarding the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security pro-
gram and its effects on fertility, savings and intergenerational transfers in overlapping gen-
erations (OLG) economies. First, what should be an appropriate equilibrium concept to
model individual incentives for intergenerational transfers? While the notion of subgame
perfect equilibrium is an appropriate equilibrium concept, there are generally many equi-
libria and computation of a subgame perfect equilibrium in OLG set-up is very complex.
This led most previous studies in this area to use the notion of open-loop Nash equilibrium
which does not fully capture the incentives in the OLG framework. Second, the literature
has remained elusive on the issues of why does there exist a PAYG social security program,
and whether it can restore Pareto optimality or lead to a Pareto superior allocation for OLG
economies.
Samuelson [1958] explained the need for a PAYG social security program to restore
Pareto optimality in pure exchange OLG economies. He assumed that agents have life-
cycle utility functions and thus there are no voluntary intergenerational transfers. Another
type of explanation postulates that there could be economy of scale and other sources of
market failures in pension provision (see, Diamond [1977]) or there might be adverse selec-
tion/moral hazard problems in private provision of retirement income insurance and these
could be mitigated by compulsory participation (see Diamond and Mirrlees [1978]).
Veall [1986] provided an alternative explanation for PAYG social security. He consid-
ered an OLG model in which each agent is assumed to derive utility not only from his/her
own life-cycle consumption, but also from the level of old-age consumption of his/her par-
ents. Due to this consumption externality, elderly may save little to extract the maximum
possible gifts from their children; ”This can lead to an inferior steady state, where no one is
consuming ’enough’ in retirement” (Veall [1986, p.250). If a PAYG social security system
is introduced such that it transfers from the young to the old at least the amount that the old
could extract from their children by saving nothing, such a social security program could
restore inter-temporal efﬁciency of consumption for each agent and Pareto optimality for
2the whole society. However, once the agents begin to save, the young may like to reduce
their social security contribution and have incentive to amend the PAYG social security leg-
islation. Thus such a PAYG system may not be stable. Veall showed that if social security
beneﬁts are set at the level of optimal steady-state old-age consumption, then such a legis-
lation will be honored by all future generations and thus is stable. Moreover, the resulting
allocation will be Pareto optimal.
Hansson and Stuart [1989] provided another closely related explanation by modeling
PAYG social security legislation as a trade among living generations. They considered an
OLG model in which agents derive utility not only from their own young age and old-age
consumption but also from properly discounted young age and old-age consumption of their
parents and of all future generations. They ﬁnd conditions under which the young and the
old agents would ﬁnd it beneﬁcial for them to agree upon a stream of PAYG social security
transfers for the current and all future generations such that the resulting allocation is Pareto
optimal and that no future generations would have incentives to amend the program.
These models did not endogenize fertility choices. If agents expect to receive gifts from
their children to support old-age consumption, it is clear that not only savings decisions but
also the fertility decisions will be affected; in fact, agents may like to have more children
than what is socially optimal.1 Hence, it is important to relax the exogenous fertility as-
sumption in the above class of models.
Recent models that study the effect of social security on fertility and savings (Barro
and Becker [1989], and Raut [1990]) the existence of a social security is not explained.
Nishimura and Zhang [1992] incorporated fertility choices in Veall’s one-sided altruism
framework. They used open-loop Nash equilibrium as a solution concept for decentralized
economy and assumed that agents care only about their parent’s old-age consumption but
not about their children’s well-being and then considered the possibility of implementing
social optimal with social security in an open loop Nash equilibrium. Following Veall,
they viewed the optimal old-age consumption in the steady-state as PAYG social security
beneﬁts. However, when fertility is also a choice variable, it is not possible to implement
1 This is an alternative formulation of old-age security hypothesis. Raut and Tran [2004] studied theo-
retically and empirically an alternative formulation of old-age security motive. They examined how parental
investment in children’s human capital is affected when parents expect old-age transfers from their children.
While human capital investment is an important intergenrational transfers decision, the focus of this paper is to
study the link among the savings, fertility and old-age resource transfers decisions.
3the optimal steady-state allocation using only a PAYG social security policy instrument; this
was possible in Veall’s framework because he treated fertility as exogenous; in fact, once
such a PAYG social security program is enacted, the free rider’s problem would cripple
the system since an individual agent will have no incentive to have children (as they do
not affect utility but cost money). Parents would like to depend on others’ children for
contribution to social security program. Since every body would behave this way, such
a social security program is not individually rational. Therefore, viewing optimal steady-
state gifts as a form of PAYG social security in Veall’s framework loses both normative and
positive virtues once fertility is a choice variable.
In this paper, I extend the literature in two respects: First, I introduce two-sided pa-
ternalistic altruism of the type that agents derive utility not only from their own young age
and old age consumption, but also from the old-age consumption of their parents and the
young age consumption of their children. Second, I introduce a more general notion of
equilibrium which includes open-loop Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium
notions as special cases. I assume that behaviors are guided by best responses, given a com-
mon ﬁxed convention and bounded rational expectations about other agents’ behaviors. I
then provide a mechanism for agents in each generation to learn the common convention by
observing their parent generation’s behaviors. When the evolutionary process converges, I
show that the limiting equilibrium produces a subgame perfect equilibrium. This procedure
leads to both selection of a subgame perfect equilibrium and computation of an equilibrium
locally. Using this procedure I study both analytically and numerically the effect of a social
security program on local subgame perfect equilibrium rate of intergenerational transfer,
fertility rate and welfare level of a representative agent.
In section 2, I set up the basic OLG model. In section 3, I deﬁne the notions of open-
loop Nash equilibrium, social optimum, and subgame perfect equilibrium. In section 4, I
explain the bounded rational framework involving conventions, learning of conventions and
the computation of a subgame perfect equilibrium locally. In section 5, I study properties
of this equilibrium. Section 6 concludes the paper.
42 The Basic Framework
I use the basic Samuelsonian [1958] overlapping generations framework and introduce two-
sided altruism to endogenize intergenerational transfers. Assume that time is discrete and is
denoted as t = 0,1,2,....; each person lives for three periods: young, adult, and old. While
young, he depends on his parents for all decisions. I follow the notational convention that
a superscript t refers to an adult of period t and a subscript t refers to time period t. For
instance, ct
t and ct
t+1 denote respectively the adult age and old-age consumption of an adult
of period t; however, nt denotes the number of children of an adult of period t, since I
assume that only adults can have children, so from the subscript of nt we can identify
which generation it corresponds to. Assume that for all t ≥ 1, the wage rate wt and the
interest rate rt are exogenously given.
Assume that all children are born identical and they all behave identically in a given
situation. An agent’s behavior regarding fertility, savings and intergenerational transfers are
guided by concerns for the well-being of children and parents which I model by assuming
that an adult of generation t derives utility from his own life-cycle consumption and from
consumption level of his children and parents that he observes during his active life-time
(see Kohlberg [1976], and Pollak [1988] for use of similar utility functions in different
contexts). More speciﬁcally, agent t’s utility function is as follows:
Ut = δ(nt−1)v(ct−1




Veall [1986] in his exogenous fertility framework and Nishimura and Zhang [1992] in their
endogenous fertility framework assumed that γ(nt) = 0 and δ(nt) to be constant, for all
t ≥ 0. In the above speciﬁcation, I allow the degree of an individual’s concern for his
parents to depend on the number of siblings. However, most of our results hold if δ(.) is
constant. I will argue later that assuming γ(nt) = 0 leads to unsatisfactory modeling of
fertility decisions.
An adult of period t earns wage income wt in the labor market and expects to receive
a bequest bt from his parents. These two sources of income constitute his budget during
adulthood. Rearing cost per child in period t is θt > 0 units of period t good. Given his
budget, he decides the amount of savings st, the number of children nt ≥ 0, the fraction
of income to be transferred to his old parents at ≥ 0; in the next period, he retires and
5expects to receive at+1nt amount of gifts from his children, earns (1 + rt+1)st as return
from his physical assets, and decides the amount of bequest bt+1 ≥ 0 to leave for each of
his children.




2 (a2,n2,s2) b3 ...
... ...
t − 1 (at−1,nt−1,st−1) bt
t (at,nt,st) ...
... ... ...
Table 1: Time table of actions by overlapping generations of agents
The effects of agent t’s action, αt = (at,nt,st,bt+1), on the levels of his own life cycle
consumption and the levels of consumption of his parents and children in the periods that
overlap with his life-cycle, depend on his parent’s action, αt−1 and his children’s action
αt+1 as follows:
ct
t + st + θtnt = (1 − at)wt + bt (2)
ct
t+1 + ntbt+1 = (1 + rt+1)st + at+1wt+1nt (3)
ct−1
t = (1 + rt)st−1 − nt−1bt + atwtnt−1 (4)
ct+1








and agent t = 0 decides the level of bequest b1, given his past decisions, n0,s0, and his
children’s decisions, α1. The arguments of his utility function are given by
c0
1 + n0b1 = (1 + r1)s0 + a1w1n0 (6)
c1




3.1 Open-loop Nash Equilibrium
Note that if 1 > a∗
t > 0 and b∗
t > 0 is an equilibrium combination of gifts and bequest in
period t, so is a∗
t +  and b∗
t + wt, for small  > 0; this can lead to gift-bequest war. This
could be handled by requiring an equilibrium to yield either positive bequest or positive gift
within a period but not both. Most commonly used equilibrium concept is an open-loop
Nash equilibrium which I deﬁne as follows:
A sequence of strategies,

αt	∞
t=0 is feasible if there exists an associated sequence







1 such that it satisﬁes the budget con-
straints (2)-(7).




such that for given initial condition, n0,s0
(i) at > 0 ⇒ bt = 0 and bt > 0 ⇒ at = 0
( ii) foranyt ≥ 1, givenαt−1 = (at−1,nt−1,st−1,bt)andαt+1 = (at+1,nt+1,st+1,bt+2)
there does not exist another strategy ˜ αt for agent t such that ˜ αt together with ατ,τ 6=
t, τ ≥ 0 form a feasible sequence of strategies, and ˜ αt yields higher utility for agent
t.
I distinguish further among different types of equilibria. An open-loop bequest equilib-
rium is an equilibrium of the above type that satisﬁes at = 0, and bt > 0 for all t ≥ 1. An
open-loop gift equilibrium is an equilibrium of the above type that further satisﬁes bt = 0,
and at > 0 for all t ≥ 1.
3.2 Social Optimum
Following Samuelson [1958], I deﬁne a social optimum to be an allocation of consumption
(cy,co) between adults and olds within a given generation and the number of children n
such that a representative agent’s utility in a stationary economy is maximized. More
formally, the problem is to choose cy,c0, and n
7max(α + γ (n))v (cy) + (β + δ (n))v (co)
subject to
cy + c0
1+n = w − nθ
I use this in the numerical example section.
3.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
An open loop Nash equilibrium framework does not fully model the incentives that agents
may have to manipulate their parents’ or their children’s behavior to extract more transfers
from them. For instance, since parents make their consumption and fertility decisions prior
to their children’s, parents may ﬁnd it strategically advantageous to consume more in their
working age, save little on physical assets and possibly have more children so that when
they become old they have little income of their own. When the children ﬁnd that their old
parents have little to consume, they will have sympathy for their parents since they care
about their parents’ consumption; thus they will transfer a larger amount of old-age support
than what they would be transferring in the open loop Nash equilibrium. The children in
turn can manipulate their children in the same way and the process could go on for ever.
To proceed more formally, I assume a particular sequencing of decisions within each
period in order to compute and study the properties of subgame perfect equilibrium. More
speciﬁcally, I divide each time period t into two stages denoted by t and t.1 (stage t.1
follows stage t) at which the live agents of period t are to make decisions. At stage t, which
is the beginning of period t, the agent t−1’s decisions (at−1,nt−1,st−1) are part of history
and are assumed to be observable to the live agents t−1 and t. Denote these past decisions
at stage t by ht. Given a realization of the history ht, the agent t − 1 decides to bequeath
bt to each of his children and each of his children decides the fraction at of their income
to be given as gift to their parents. Both agents make their decisions simultaneously and
independently. The game moves to stage t.1 at which both agents observe the outcome up
to stage t.1. Denote a typical realization of these decisions at stage t.1 by ht.1. Given a
realization of the history ht.1 at stage t.1, the agent t−1 does not make anymore household
decision, agent t, however, decides the number of children and savings (nt,st). Figure 1
depicts a part of the extensive form of the game starting at stage t. The tree is shown only
8ents did such and such. I consider only pay-off relevant strategies: From equations (2)-(5),
and the arguments of the utility function, it is clear that the only information from history
that is relevant to decision making of the agents at stage t is agent t−1’s own past decision
regarding (st−1,nt−1), and thus I consider the bequest decision rule of agent t − 1 to be of
the form bt (nt−1,st−1), and the old-age transfer decision rule of agent t to be of the form
at (nt−1,st−1); similarly at stage t.1, the agent t’s actions depend on his own past deci-
sion at and his parent’s bequest decision bt, only through the net effect, atwt − bt which
I represent as functions of the form, nt = nt (atwt − bt), and st = st(atwt − bt). Thus
agent t’s strategies are functions of the type: at = at(nt−1,st−1), nt = nt (atwt − bt), and
st = st(atwt − bt) and bt+1(nt,st). Whenever actions at any stage are functions of past
actions, they are known as reaction functions. Putting all the actions and reactions of agent
t from all stages of the game together, it is easy to see that a proﬁle of pure strategies of all
agents together is given by,
At =

(at(nt−1,st−1),nt(atwt − bt),st(atwt − bt),bt+1(nt,st)) for all agents t ≥ 1
b1(n0,s0) for agent t = 0
where, each component belongs to the relevant strategy space speciﬁed above. Note that
agent t’s actions, nt,st,at, and bt+1 now belong to function spaces, whereas in open loop
Nash equilibrium they were non-negative real numbers. I use the following characterization
of the subgame perfect equilibrium notion.









, for agent t ≥ 1, and A∗
0 =
b∗
1(n0,s0) for agent t = 0, is said to be a subgame perfect equilibrium if
1. for all agents t ≥ 1 and for any nt−1,st−1, bt = b∗









t+1(nt,st) maximize Ut, subject to agent t’s budget constraint deter-
mined by the given optimal reaction functions of the other agents, and




of agent t = 1, the reaction function b∗
1(n0,s0) maximizes his utility within his bud-
get constraint determined by the given optimal reaction functions of agent 1.
103.3.1 The First Order Conditions for a Subgame Perfect Gift Equilibrium
Let at+1(nt,st), nt+1 (at+1wt+1 − bt+1), st+1(at+1wt+1 − bt+1) be the optimal reaction
functions of agent t + 1, and let nt−1, st−1 be any feasible actions of agent t − 1. Taking
these decisions as given, agent t chooses a feasible At = at(nt−1,st−1), nt(atwt − bt),
st(atwt − bt), bt+1(nt,st) that maximizes his utility. For t > 1, the ﬁrst order necessary







(1 + rt)st−1 + atwtnt−1 − nt−1bt)...
−αv0(
ct
t z }| {
(1 − at)wt − st − θtnt + bt) ≤ 0,and = 0 if at > 0
(8)
−βv0(ct−1
t )nt−1 + γ(nt−1)v0(ct
t)[1 − θtn0
t(bt − atwt) − s0
t(bt − atwt)] ≤ 0,






t+1 z }| {
[1 + rt+1)st + at+1 (.)wt+1nt − ntbt+1])×
[(1 + rt+1) + wt+1ntat+1,2(nt,st)] − γ(nt)v0(
ct+1
t+1 z }| {
(1 − at+1)wt+1 − st+1 − θt+1nt+1 + bt+1)×







t+1)[wt+1at+1,1(nt,st)] ≤ 0, and = 0 if nt > 0
(11)
Similar to open loop Nash equilibrium, I can deﬁne subgame perfect gift equilibrium
and subgame perfect bequest equilibrium. However, in the rest of the paper I analyze only
the properties of the subgame perfect gift equilibria.
In this framework, a subgame perfect equilibrium with differentiable reaction functions
may not exist. Even when there exists one, it is not possible to compute all subgame perfect
11gift equilibrium reaction functions from the above ﬁrst order conditions.2 If we further
restrict to a stationary local subgame perfect equilibrium, could we compute it using the
ﬁrst order conditions? More formally, assume that the wage rate wt = w, the interest rate
rt = r, and the cost of raising children θt = θ for all t ≥ 1.
Deﬁnition 3 A stationary local subgame perfect gift equilibrium is a vector of fertility
level, savings amount, and the rate of old-age support to parents, (n∗,s∗,a∗) ≥ 0 and a
vector of reaction functions (a(nt−1,st−1),n(atwt −bt),s(atwt −bt)) deﬁned in a neigh-
borhood3 of (n∗,s∗,a∗) such that
a∗ = a(n∗,s∗), n∗ = n(a∗w)), s∗ = s(a∗w)
and
at(nt−1,st−1) = a(nt−1,st−1)
nt(atwt − bt) = n(atwt − bt)
st(atwt − bt) = s(atwt − bt)
bt (nt−1,st−1) = 0 for all t ≥ 1
and that the above satisﬁes the system of equations (8)-(11) for all t ≥ 1 with initial condi-
tion, n0 = n∗, and s0 = s∗.
Could one compute a stationary local subgame perfect equilibrium reaction functions
from the above ﬁrst order conditions (8)-(11)? To that end, denote the one period lag value
and the one period forward value of a variable x by x− and x+ respectively, the system of
equations (8)-(11) for a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium becomes:




v0 ([1 − a(.)]w − s − θn))
v0 ((1 + r)s− + a(.)wn−)
(12)
Ψb (a(n ,s ),s + θn) ≡ −βv0((1 + r)s− + a(.)wn−)n + γ(n−)...
v0 ([1 − a(.)]w − s − θn))[1 − θn0 − s0] ≤ 0 and = 0 if b > 0
(13)
2 See Kohlberg [1976] for a discussion of such problems in a similar framework.
3 The adjective ”local” in the deﬁnition refers to this neighborhood restriction.
12Ψs  
a(n ,s ),a+ (n,s),a+
2 (n,s),n,s,s+ + θn+
≡
−αv0 ([1 − a]w − s − θn)) + βv0 ((1 + r)s + a(n,s)nw)((1 + r) + nwa2(n,s))...





≤ 0 and = 0 if s > 0
(14)
Ψn  
a(n ,s ),a+ (n,s),a+
1 (n,s),n,s,s+ + θn+
≡





+ γ0(n)v([1 − a+(n,s)]w − s+ − θn+)...





≤ 0, and = 0 if n > 0
(15)
Since we are trying to compute a local gift equilibrium, we restrict our computation to
a neighborhood in which b(n−,s−) ≡ 0, and thus assume that the no bequest constraint in
equation (13) is satisﬁed as an inequality. Notice that one can solve for a(.) as a function
of n− and s− from equation (12) treating n and s as given, and then solve for n and s from
equations (14)-(15) after plugging in the values of a(.),a1(.) and a2(.). This cannot work
since n and s in equation (12) are implicit functions of a, and hence it will not be possible to
calculate a(.),a1(.) and a2(.) from equation (12) alone. This is a curse on subgame perfect
equilibrium in overlapping generations models.
4 Convention, Learning, andSubgamePerfectGiftEquilibrium
In the previous section we saw that it was not possible to compute a subgame perfect gift
equilibrium even locally around a steady-state using the ﬁrst order conditions. Furthermore,
there are generally multiple subgame perfect equilibria, and the literature on equilibrium
selection theory does not guide us in the overlapping generations context to select an equi-
librium. To make progress, I adopt the recent developments in evolutionary game theory
for repeated normal form ﬁnite games to the OLG set-up.
Much of the evolutionary game theory literature assumes that a game with a ﬁnite num-
ber of pure strategies is played repeatedly many times by randomly drawn players from
a large population (see for instance Fudenberg and Levine [1998], and Weibull[1995]). It
13combines two processes: a selection process that postulates which strategies yield higher
pay-offs given the actions of all players, and a mutation process which randomly creates
exceptions to the evolutionary process. The selection process has been formulated in vari-
ous ways. For instance, as natural selection, imitation reinforcement and best response. In
this paper, I consider a best response model with bounded rational expectations about other
agents’ behaviors and deﬁne a notion of equilibrium with ﬁxed common convention that en-
compasses open-loop Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium as specializations
of this equilibrium.
4.1 Gift Equilibrium with a common convention
The bounded rationality of this paper consists of three assumptions: First, at every stage t,
each agent follows a common ”convention” that if he transfers a fraction at of his income
to his old-parents at stage t, then he spends St = σ (at) on savings for old-age and on
children at stage t.1. Here σ (.) is a convention. It is common to all individuals. It could be
viewed as a threat strategy that a child may use if his parent did not save enough for old-age.
Second, each agent assumes that his children will react to his decisions exactly the way he
reacts to his parent’s decisions, that is the reaction function a() that he chooses will be also
the reaction function of his children. Third, given a convention σ (), an individual chooses
an action that maximizes his utility, i.e., individual behavior is guided by best response
given a convention σ () and assumption about others’ behaviors.
Assuming that the conventions belong to a well-behaved family of functions, notice
that given a decision (a−,n−,s−) of the parent generation, (using implicit function the-
orem) one can solve for the best response (a(n−,s−),n(a),s(a)) from equations (12),
(13)and (15) as follows: The reaction function a(.) is a solution of equation (12) with
s + θn = σ(a(n−,s−)); the other two functions n(a),s(a) are solutions of equations (14)
and (15) after substituting s+ + θn+ = σ (a(n,s)). I denote the set of best responses by
BR(a−,n−,s−;σ) whose elements are the vectors (a,n,s) of optimal choices of adult
agent t. While in general BR(a−,n−,s−;σ) could be a correspondence, I assume that
economies satisfy conditions such that BR(a−,n−,s−;σ) is a function. Given a popula-
tion distribution µ− of decisions (a−,n−,s−) by adults of previous generation, and given a
conventionσ, thebestresponsefunctionBR(a−,n−,s−;σ)determinethedistributionofµ
14ofcurrentgeneration’sdecisions(a,n,s)andthereactionfunctions(a(n−,s−),n(a),s(a)).
For a given σ, I refer to BR(a−,n−,s−;σ) as a stationary gift equilibrium with common
convention σ.
The above bounded rationality is very strong and not self-fulﬁlling. To see this, assume
that a convention σ () is followed at stage t.1. Parents make their bequest decision bt = 0
and an adult child make his old-age transfer decision at at stage t that maximize their
respective utility functions. But when the game moves to stage t.1, the children choose
their best responses nt (at) and st (at) given at which may not satisfy the convention that
was assumed at stage t, i.e., ¯ σ (a) ≡ θnt (a) + st (a) may not be equal to σ (a) that was
assumed at stage t, i.e. his decisions are not time-consistent. I will address this in the
subsection on learning. The following result is now straightforward.
Proposition 1 Suppose (a(n−,s−),n,s) ∈ BR (a−,n−,s−;σ∗) is a stationary gift equi-
libriumwithaﬁxedconventionσ∗ suchthats(a)+θn(a) = σ∗ (a).Thena(n−,s−),n(a),s(a)
is a stationary subgame perfect gift equilibrium.
Notice that the ﬁxed convention σ (.) corresponding to a subgame perfect equilibrium
does not have the time inconsistency problem mentioned above. But how do individuals in
a society arrive at such a common convention? I address this in the next subsection.
4.2 The Gift Equilibrium with Learned Conventions
In the previous subsection I assumed that individuals somehow know the subgame perfect
convention σ (a). In this section I provide a learning mechanism starting with an arbitrary
convention and an evolutionary process with and without mutation, and show that when the
learning process converges, the limiting distribution gives a subgame perfect equilibrium.
This learning procedure could also be used to compute a subgame perfect equilibrium.
4.2.1 Learning
Let µt−1 be the population distribution of actions (at−1,nt−1,st−1) that are chosen by the
adults of generation t − 1. The old parents and the adult children at stage t observe the
distribution µt−1, and then compute conditional expectation of St−1 ≡ θnt−1 +st−1 given
at−1. Letthisconditionalexpectationbedenotedasσt−1 (at−1).Atstaget, oldparentsand
15their adult children presume this will be the convention that will be followed in future and
make choices (at,nt,st) ∈ BR(at−1,nt−1,st−1;σt−1). Note that given the distribution
µt−1 of (at−1,nt−1,st−1), the associated convention σt−1, and the best response function
BR(at−1,nt−1,st−1;σt−1), the distribution µt of actions (at,nt,st) and the convention
σt (which is the conditional expectation of St ≡ θnt + st given at) are determined and the
process iterates over time to go on for ever. Denote the evolutionary process for convention
by σt = Φ(σt−1). When this process converges, it converges to a ﬁxed point σ∗of this
map Φ, which is the long-run learned convention, and it is self-fulﬁlling and time consistent
and hence also a subgame perfect equilibrium.
It is possible that when the process σt = Φ(σt−1) converges to the ﬁxed point σ∗, the
support of the distribution µt might shrink to the degenerate distribution concentrated at a
point (a∗,n∗,s∗) ∈ BR(a∗,n∗,s∗;σ∗). Then there will be no variation in the population
distribution of optimal actions. How does one learn the reaction functions if there is only
one type of observation? In evolutionary game theory the problem is handled by assuming
that, in each period, a fraction ε of population experiments or mutates i.e., instead of choos-
ing (at,nt,st) ∈ BR(at−1,nt−1,st−1;σt−1), an agent makes a random choice around
(at,nt,st) in their feasible set. This creates varieties and the support of the distribution µt
does not degenerate. One then studies the limiting invariant distribution µ∗ and learned
convention σ∗. I pursue this line of enquiry in another paper.
4.3 Computation of local gift equilibria with learned conventions
I now use the learning algorithm to compute a local subgame perfect equilibrium and study
the effect on the equilibrium when a PAYG social security program is introduced. No-
tice that since we are computing a local subgame perfect equilibrium, we can restrict our
computation to a small neighborhood around a steady-state (a∗,n∗,s∗) and to a linear spec-
iﬁcation for σ (.) of the following form:
σ(a) = s∗ + θn∗ + (a − a∗)wσ0 (16)
Assume that the utility function satisﬁes the following:




, ρ 6= 1, 0 < ρ < ∞ (17)
where −ρ measures the elasticity of marginal utility.
Assumption A: 2 γ(n) = γ0n1−γ1, 0 ≤ γ1 < 1
The signiﬁcance of this assumption is that parents care about consumption of all children
equally. However, the weight they give to such consumption decreases with the number of
children whenever γ1 > 0.
Assumption A: 3 δ(n) = δ0nδ1−1, 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ 1
I refer this economy as CEM economy. Consider a PAYG social program of the type
that the an adult of generation t pays τwt as social security taxes, and receives τntwt+1 as
social security beneﬁts when he is old. Although, the beneﬁts τntwt+1 depends on agent
t’s number of children nt, he takes it as an externality. For a given value of σ0 = σ0∗ the
steady-state local learning equilibrium a(n,s) for our CEM economy is given by
a(n,s) =










For all reasonable non-negative values of σ0∗, it is clear from equation (18) that ∂a
∂τ < 0,
and it is not necessarily equal to −1. That is social security does not perfectly crowd-
out private transfers. One can easily verify that both a1(.) and a2(.) are negative for this
reaction function. While it is not possible to analytically derive the effect of τ on fertility
and savings, for various values of σ0, I numerically found the effect of τ on equilibrium
fertility level to be always negative.
A typical phase diagram for the evolution of convention that emerged in our numeri-
cal CEM economies is shown in ﬁgure 2. From the ﬁgure, it is clear that there are two
local subgame perfect gift equilibria, and the learning convention converges to the stable
equilibrium.
17other one with s > 0, and the former equilibrium always produced a higher level of utility
and a higher level of old-age support in the steady-state. Furthermore, a gift equilibrium
with ﬁxed convention with respect to a large σ0∗ is very close to the corresponding open-
loop Nash equilibrium. In panels (a) and (b) of ﬁgure 3 corresponding to the cases s = 0
and s > 0, I have plotted the graph of Φ(σ0∗) around its ﬁxed points for our calibrated
economy.
Table 2: Steady-state local learning and subgame perfect gift equilibria for the economy
































-0.0884944056 (1.4123165415, 0, 0.39660878 -1.1724263009)
Table 3: Steady-state local learning and subgame perfect gift equilibria for the economy
















0.036904528 (3.6475198, 0,0.00802, -1.1506664)
Note that in both economies, a PAYG social security reduces the local subgame perfect
19equilibrium fertility level. The main distinguishing features of these two economies are that
for the economy of the ﬁrst table, the socially optimal fertility rate is above the local sub-
game perfect equilibrium level of fertility and introduction of a social security reduces the
steady-state welfare level of a representative agent. For the economy of the second table,
the socially optimal fertility level is below the local subgame perfect equilibrium fertility
level, and introduction of a social security program improves the steady-state welfare level
of a representative agent. These qualitative properties are insensitive to small changes to
the parameter values. Furthermore, neither economies produced convergent convention se-
quences for equilibrium of either type (i.e., s = 0, or s > 0) when I tried social security tax
rate close to the rate implied by the social optimal solution.
5 Properties of Gift Equilibrium
In this section I study the properties of steady-state local learning equilibria for which the
associated σ0∗ > −1. These results are also true, in particular, for any local subgame per-
fect gift equilibria for which the associated σ0∗ > −1 (this is true for instance, for the CEM
economy in our numerical example above). The following proposition shows that the equi-
librium reaction of children to parents’ higher savings is to reduce old-age support to their
parents.
Proposition 2 Let v(.) be twice continuously differentiable with v00(c) < 0 ∀ c > 0,
then for all (n,s) that lead to positive consumptions in each period, equation (13) has a
continuously differentiable solution a(n,s) and ∂a(n,s)/∂s < 0.
Proof. Assume that τ = 0. Substituting s + θn = σ(a) from equation (16) in equation










Hence the ﬁrst part follows from the implicit function theorem. Using the implicit function











21While the effect of a parent’s savings on the rate of transfers from children is negative,
it’s effect on the number of children is ambiguous. To see this, denote by φ(n) ≡ δ(n).n/α
and assume that φ(n) is an increasing function of n. Proceeding in the same manner as in








1)(1 + σ0∗) + φ(n)wnv00(c∗
2)]
Note that both the bracketed terms in the above are negative and the ﬁrst term of the nu-
merator are positive. Thus the sign of the right hand side of the above partial derivative will
depend on the relative magnitudes of the bracketed terms and the ﬁrst term on the numera-
tor. In the numerical example that I considered earlier, the right hand side is unambiguously
negative for all the parameter values that I considered. That means, if parents have more
children, they would receive less gifts from each child. The total gift, however, could be
higher.
The following proposition ﬁnds condition under which a local learning equilibrium is
also a open-loop gift equilibrium in the steady-state.
Proposition 3 A stationary local gift equilibrium with common convention σ0∗ = ∞ is
also a steady-state open-loop gift equilibrium
Proof. Notice above that if σ0∗ = ∞, then both a1(n,s) and a2(n,s) are zero for equilib-
rium reaction function a(.), and thus it follows from equations (13)-(12) and equation (??)
that the equilibrium conditions for the steady-state local learning equilibrium is the same as
the conditions for steady-state open-loop gift equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Although, a threat to parents by the children of the type σ0∗ = ∞ leads to open-loop
Nash equilibrium but it is incredible since it sounds like:
”if his parents choose levels of fertility and saving different from that are pre-
scribed by the open loop Nash-equilibrium level n∗,s∗ and thus induce him to
transfer more (resp. less) amount than that is prescribed by open-loop Nash
equilibrium, he will consume nothing (resp. consume everything that he has,
and if necessary he will borrow against his children) during his adult age.”
22A feasible steady-state allocation is said to be Pareto Optimal if there does not exist
another feasible steady-state allocation that gives higher utility to a representative agent. 4
Proposition 4 Consider an economy that has a stationary local gift equilibrium with com-
mon convention σ0∗ as (s∗,n∗, a∗(.,.)) with s∗ = 0 and no bequest constraint (13) holds as













≡ µ > 0 and δ(n∗) < µ (19)
thenallagentscanbemadebetter-offwithasuitablydesignedpay-as-you-gosocialsecurity
program. Hence such an equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.
Proof. Consider a pay-as-you-go social security program which marginally taxes all adult
agents and redistributes the revenues equally among their old parents. Suppose for the
moment that agents do not change their fertility and savings decisions in response to in-
troduction of such a social security program. The utility gains of a representative agent
is n∗βv0(c∗
2) from the increased consumption in the old-age. The utility loss is given by
αv0(c∗
1) + γ(n)v0(c∗
1), where the ﬁrst term corresponds to welfare loss due to fall in own
adult-age consumption and the second term corresponds to the welfare loss due to reduction

















In deriving the above I have used equation (13). The fertility will also respond to the
social security program.. If the fertility rate without a social security program is above
the social optimal rate ( in our numerical simulation I found this to be the case when an
economy satisﬁes condition (19), for instance, the economy in table 3), introduction of a
social security program with a small tax rate τ will lead to a higher utility level of the
4 This is a modiﬁed version of Pareto Optimality, modiﬁed to take into account the problem of comparing
non-existing individuals’ utililities under two different feasible steady-state allocations. See Raut [1990] for a
discussion of this problem and the related literature on this issue.
23representative agent (see again the numerical example in table3). If the initial fertility
rate of the subgame perfect equilibrium without social security is, however, lower than the
socially optimal fertility level, one needs to integrate a social security program with an
appropriate population policy so that fertility rate does not fall because of social security.
With this integration of policies, a social security program can lead to a higher utility level
of a representative agent in the steady-state.
Q.E.D.
The implication of the above results for social security program is that when fertility
is endogenous, introduction of a social security program may improve welfare level of a
representative agent. But unlike in the case of exogenous fertility, the social security by
itself would not produce the social optimal welfare level for a representative agent. The
social security program needs be complemented by an appropriate population policy to
attain social optimal.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have considered an OLG model of endogenous fertility, savings and inter-
generational transfers. I have argued that the commonly used open-loop Nash equilibrium
does not fully capture the individual incentives that agents have in making these decisions
in an OLG economy. It is more appropriate to use the notion of subgame perfect equilib-
rium. There are generally multiple subgame perfect equilibria and it is, in general, difﬁcult
to compute a subgame perfect equilibrium. I have introduced a unifying notion of equilib-
rium in which behaviors are guided by best responses given a ﬁxed convention and bounded
rational expectations about other agents’ behaviors. This equilibrium notion includes both
the notions of subgame perfect equilibrium and the open loop Nash equilibrium as special
cases. Ihaveprovidedalearningmechanismspecifyinghowagentslearnaboutthecommon
convention by observing their parent generation’s choices. This generates an evolutionary
process for convention. I have shown that when this evolutionary process converges, the
resulting learned convention produces a subgame perfect equilibrium. This provides a ra-
tionale for equilibrium selection and a method to compute a subgame perfect equilibrium
24locally around a steady-state. I have used this method to compute a local subgame perfect
equilibrium numerically using the Maple software and my own C++ codes.
Based on analytical and numerical results, I have shown that a PAYG social security
program improves the steady-state welfare level of a representative agent when the fertility
level without social security in the subgame perfect equilibrium is higher than the socially
optimal level. When the fertility level without social security in the subgame perfect equi-
librium is lower than the socially optimal level, a PAYG social security program lowers
the welfare level. Furthermore, I have shown that a PAYG social security program always
reduced the fertility level and the level of voluntary within family old-age support. The
reduction in old-age support is, however, less than a dollar for a dollar increase in social
security beneﬁts.
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